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Abstract
The recent European competition law reform abolished the more than 40 year-old notiﬁcation 
regime according to which companies routinely notiﬁed to the European Commission all kinds 
of envisaged commercial agreements and cooperative business practices other than mergers 
and acquisitions (e.g. production and R&D joint ventures, licensing and franchising contracts, 
marketing and sales agreements, information exchange and other collaborative activities with 
their competitors). A new system of private self-enforcement of European competition law 
will come in place, which hinges upon two dimensions: enhanced emphasis is given to private 
self-assessment and the facilitation of legal actions by private entities before the national and 
the European courts. The shift towards private enforcement reﬂects an incremental change 
of competition control. It represents a case of convergence towards the US competition law 
enforcement system. This paper puts the two dimensions of private self-enforcement in a context 
of a broader discursive shift in contemporary European economic governance and argues that 
the reliance on the ʻmarket intelligence  ʼ in spotting anti-competitive practices indicates a 
regulatory transformation from a clear-cut, formal and supervisory public control towards a 
more insecure and more laissez-faire market-based solution. Although it remains to be seen 
what future impacts the reform will cause, the paper somewhat tentatively contends that this 
is a rather risky endeavor with regard to regulatory stringency as it may stimulate a claimantʼs 
culture driven merely by proﬁt motives. The ones to proﬁt from private self-assessment and 
increased litigations are law companies providing advocacy services to other companies. 
I would like to thank Andreas Nölke, Henk Overbeek, Laura Horn, Tanja Aalberts, Arjan Vliegenthart, and James 
Perry for their helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1“It sʼ like listening to a piece of symphonic music: you hear the main theme over and over again 
in different ways, so that by the time you leave the concert hall you are humming the tune.”
John Fingleton, Chairmen of the Irish Competition Authority, at the European Competition 
Day, 22nd October 2004 in Amsterdam. 
Introduction
In the US, the most outrageous and ridiculous lawsuits that ﬁnd their way to US courts are 
honored by annual Stella Awards, named after Stella Liebeck, the 79-year old woman that in 
1992 sued McDonaldʼs for her burns after she spilled hot coffee on herself and won $2.9 million. 
The most frivolous candidate of this yearʼs award is Mr. Merv Grazinski of Oklahoma City, 
who set the cruise control at 70 mph in his brand new 32-foot Winnebago motor home. When 
the car crashed after he got himself a cup of coffee at the back of the vehicle, Mr. Grazinski sued 
Winnebago for not having warned him in the manual about the consequences of leaving the 
drivers seat. Meanwhile, the company has included an extra advice on this topic in their manual 
(see for more examples www.stellaawards.com). 
 Although the Stella Awards are a hoax rather than a serious contest, they are symbolic 
for an excessive culture of litigation that has run out of control - a culture of litigation in which 
ʻaccidents  ʼhardly exist anymore. One might wonder how the above examples are related to the 
recent overhaul of European competition law. Although there is no immediate reason to assume 
that the EU moves towards a comparable claimantʼs culture found in the US, the abolishment 
of the notiﬁcation procedure that came along with the new competition law enforcement regime 
of 1 May 2004 raises some concerns that point into that direction. 
 With the welcoming of the 10 new Member States into the European Union, the 
European competition regime has undergone a major overhaul, which came in form of a reform 
package of substantial and procedural changes. One of the changes concerned the system for the 
enforcement of the competition laws. By the replacement of Regulation 17 with Regulation No. 
1/2003 all signs are set towards increased private enforcement of European competition law. 
The new regulation abolishes the notiﬁcation system with regard to Article 81 (TEC) according 
to which companies could have assured by the European Commission that an envisaged deal 
other than a cross-border merger or an acquisition did not violate European Commission law. 
Article 81 (TEC) regulates the prohibition of restrictive business practices and cartels, such as 
anticompetitive agreements between direct competitors (horizontal restraints) and agreements 
between companies involved in the different stages of the production-, distribution, or marketing 
process (vertical restraints). Under the new system, commercial agreements between companies 
above a certain turnover threshold, such as joint ventures, distribution and supplier agreements, 
licensing and franchising contracts, etc. can no longer be notiﬁed to the European Commission, 
whose approval to a deal used to guarantee immunity from legal prosecution. As far as mergers 
2and state aid is concerned, the speciﬁc notiﬁcation system remains applicable, which means 
that the reform only partly abolishes the notiﬁcation system in competition matters. Yet, the 
fact that business agreements other than mergers and acquisitions can no longer be notiﬁed to 
the European Commission implies that companies have to assess by themselves whether an 
agreement infringes with Article 81 (TEC). 
 Next to the greater emphasis on private self-assessment, the competition reform aims 
at facilitating legal actions by private entities before the national and the European courts. 
The European Commission strongly promotes private enforcement of European competition 
law. It forecasts a positive feedback loop according to which the mere threat of litigations 
is believed to effect sufﬁcient deterrence and less violation of competition rules. Following 
a speech given by Mario Monti (2004a), the former Commissioner of Competition, private 
competition enforcement is believed to catalyze a ʻculture of competition  ʼby raising awareness 
of competitors and consumers on competition law infringements by market players, which 
ultimately is expected to increase overall welfare gains.
 The shift towards increased private litigation reﬂects an incremental change of 
competition control. Although competition authorities in Europe have always relied on private 
complaints, private damage claims at the European courts are very seldom. The European 
Commission enjoyed a virtual monopoly over European competition law enforcement, while the 
national competition law enforcement belonged to the exclusive domain of national competition 
authorities (NCAs). In this vein, the new private enforcement regime is exemplary for an overall 
tendency of shifting away from supervisory market control to less market intervention by public 
authorities. Moreover, it illustrates a major step of convergence towards the US system, where 
90% of all antitrust cases are private actions, whereas in Europe only 5% of all cases are due to 
private litigations and 95% are constituted by public enforcement (Kemper 2004: 9). 
 A broad debate on the implications of the major overhaul of European competition law 
still has to follow. Although the decision for private competition enforcement has been taken, 
there are still many legal ambiguities that need to be further clariﬁed. The European Commission 
intends to issue a Green Paper in the near future in order to consult different stakeholders on the 
issue of private enforcement in competition law. 
 The paper elaborates on two sets of questions that arise with the heightened emphasis 
on corporate self-reliance in the ﬁeld of European competition law enforcement. First, there is 
much reason to assume that private self-enforcement represents a case of convergence towards 
the US enforcement system. Thus, what is converging and how can we interpret the recent 
steps of convergence towards the US model of increased private enforcement? Second, what 
are possible consequences of increased private enforcement of competition laws for corporate 
actors in particular and the wider society more general? What is at stake and who is likely to 
proﬁt from the new enforcement situation?
 The paper is organized as follows: the ﬁrst section introduces into the technical details 
of private self-enforcement and embeds the issue into the recent European competition reform 
3package. Section two examines private enforcement in the light of convergence towards the 
US model by sketching the major differences of the two systems by means of a comparison. It 
further explores the possible implications of enhanced private enforcement in the EU. Section 
three sketches the discourse of enhanced private competition law enforcement, while section 
four is devoted to those proﬁting most from enhanced private enforcement, e.g. the legal 
professions. The concluding section strikes a balance between public and private enforcement. 
1 The Overhaul of European Competition Law
The European competition reform effective since 1 May 2004 has been proclaimed as the most 
important legal and cultural policy revolution in the history of European competition law.1 
It leads to far-reaching changes with regard to the substance of European competition law 
and introduces new procedural issues of enforcement, as well as a range of non-legislative 
instruments. The new system of private self-assessment and enhanced private litigation forms 
part of an integrated package of different reform measures. In order to better understand the 
private enforcement in competition matters, I will brieﬂy sketch the most fundamental changes 
of the overhaul.
1.1 The 2004 Competition Reform in a Nutshell
Although the basic provisions of European Competition law remain unchanged, the reform alters 
the substance of the test applied to determine whether a dominant position by company is anti-
competitive. A new merger regulation, Regulation No. 139/2004, has been introduced, which 
replaces the ʻDominance-test  ʼwith a sort hybrid of the ʻSubstantive Lessening of Competition  ʼ
(SLC)-test applied in the USA.
 On the procedural level, the more than forty-year-old Regulation 17 got replaced 
by a new procedural instrument, Regulation No. 1/2003, which has a profound impact on 
how competition law will be enforced in the future. Under Regulation 17 competition law 
enforcement has been subject to the powers of the European Commission only, who has been 
judge, jury, executor altogether. Article 6 of the new regulation abolishes the highly centralized 
European competition system and re-allocates enforcement competences. Next to the European 
Commissionʼs DG Competition and the European courts in Luxembourg, also national 
competition authorities (NCAs) and national courts can now fully apply Article 81 (TEC) and 
82 (TEC), which govern the ﬁght against cartels and the abuse of dominant positions. This 
means that under the new system competition law enforcement has become more decentralized. 
The European institutions loose their exclusive jurisdiction on large cross-border transactions 
and share antitrust enforcement with their counterparts on the Member State level. National 
competition law enforcers in turn have to apply European laws in addition to their own national 
competition laws.2 
 The reform introduces two non-legislative instruments: the European Competition 
Network (ECN) and the Chief Competition Economist: in order to facilitate a uniform application 
4of European competition law, the new regulation established the European Competition Network 
(ECN). The network provides an opportunity for close cooperation, information exchange and 
case allocation between the 26 competition authorities and the European and national courts.3 
The re-allocation of competences in competition enforcement follows the logic that the best-
placed authority should handle a competition complaint and conduct the necessary investigation, 
resembling a de facto de-centralization according to the logic of the principle of subsidiarity.4 
Moreover, a post called the Chief Competition Economist has been established - responsible for 
bringing more checks and balances into the much criticized bastion of Commission power by 
providing ʻindependent economic viewpoints  ʼin the enforcement of European competition law 
with regard to high proﬁle mergers. 
 The introduction of Regulation No. 1/2003 will most strongly affect Article 81 (TEC) 
governing the prohibition of anti-competitive agreements as it abolishes the pre-notiﬁcation 
system for cooperative business agreements. Yet, the profound impact and the wider implications 
of this regulatory change tend to be overlooked by many commentators that discuss the 
competition overhaul (cf. Diaz 2004). In a next section, I will examine this part of the reform 
package in greater detail.
  
1.2 Private Enforcement in the Light of Regulation No. 1/2003  
The more than 40 year-old notiﬁcation system spelled out in Regulation 17 will not completely 
be abolished, but slimmed down considerably. Regulation No. 1/2003 abolishes the notiﬁcation 
procedure with regard to Article 81 (TEC) under which companies have routinely notiﬁed on a 
voluntary basis all kinds of agreements and business practices other than mergers and acquisitions 
in advance to the Commission.5 To avoid any misunderstandings, the notiﬁcation system for the 
enforcement of Article 82 (TEC), e.g. mergers and acquisitions with a Community-dimension, 
as well as for state aid as spelled out in Article 88 (TEC) and 89 (TEC) remain in place.6  
 Under the old Regulation 17 dating from 6 February 1962 companies could have assured 
whether they did not violate Article 81 (TEC) by notifying an agreement to the Commission. 
The Commission gave formal clearance by means of individual or block exemptions. Block 
exemptions are a sort fast track clearance procedure, which cover whole categories of 
agreements and sector-speciﬁc agreements that are not considered anticompetitive. For example, 
block exemptions have been granted if a cooperation concerned research and development, 
standardization and specialization (Cini and McGowan 1998: 98).
 Under the new system, the possibility to notify cooperative agreements and receive 
individual exemption by the European Commission, which automatically granted immunity, 
has been eliminated. Moreover, the Commission has lost the exclusive competence to apply 
Article 81(3) on granting block exemptions as national jurisdictions can enforce Article 81 as 
a whole, including the granting of block exemptions. Yet, a new block exemption scheme has 
come into place that speciﬁes more clearly the types of agreements that are prohibited (e.g. price 
ﬁxing and market sharing). It rules that restrictive agreements falling into Article 81(1), which 
5are not covered by Article 81(3) and Article 82, do not require a ʻprior decisions to that effectʼ. 
Thus, companies will have to decide on their own whether the criteria for block exemptions 
stipulated under Article 81(3) can be applied. With any other type of cooperation agreements 
companies have to assess by themselves whether or not the envisaged commercial agreement 
restricts competition. Hence, the abolishment of the notiﬁcation procedure for Article 81 (TEC) 
puts the responsibility to ensure that a conduct is in accordance with European competition law 
into the hands of business. 
 However, private enforcement reaches further than a self-assessment by companies 
of whether or not an envisaged deal infringes upon European competition law. With the new 
regulation, the Commission hopes to stimulate a situation in which more private legal actions 
are brought to the courts. Thus, companies may be freed from the administrative work of prior 
notiﬁcations when making commercial agreements, yet, if they assess the situation wrong 
they risk to be litigated before the courts. To put it differently, only court decisions can decide 
whether or not a commercial agreement, such as production joint ventures or other alliances 
that do not fall under the merger regulation, infringes with European competition law. 
 Private litigation before the European courts complementary to public enforcement of 
Article 81 and 82 (TEC) has always been possible, but did not lead to a widely applied practice. 
This does not mean that private entities were absent in the enforcement of European competition 
law. On the contrary, any legal or natural person could request the Commission to take action in 
case of a conduct that seemed anticompetitive. The Commission was obliged to give a reasoned 
decision if it refused to take action. Private parties could again invoke a judicial review at the 
Court of First Instance (CFI) in case they were unsatisﬁed with this decision (Wils 2003: 476). 
Under the old system, the burden of proof in case of an infringement of competition law has been 
with the Commission, while companies invoked European competition law overwhelmingly 
as ʻshield  ʼ for defending themselves (Wils 2003: 473, 475). Under the new regulation, the 
Commission hopes to encourage actions by private parties before courts who use Article 81 and 
82 as a ʻsword  ʼfor initiating judicial proceedings (Kemper 2004: 7). So far, Regulation 1/2003 
does not specify how to stimulate private actions before the courts, except from article 7 of 
Regulation No. 1/2003, which lays out the possibility of ʻawarding damages to the victims of 
infringementsʼ. Thus, private parties can claim for ﬁnancial or injunctive relief for the damages 
caused to by anticompetitive behavior of another party. 
 Before elaborating on the wider implications of enhanced private enforcement of 
European competition, the next section will confront the recent reform with questions of 
convergence towards the US model of competition control in order to better explain why private 
enforcement has achieved the contemporary prominence in Europe.  
  
2 The New Regulation in the Light of Increased Convergence Towards the US 
Model? 
Convergence towards the US antitrust system has been heralded by the European Commission 
6as one of the greatest success stories of EU-US relations. The competition reform package 
of 2004 represents a case in point. According to James Rill, the former US Deputy Attorney 
General for Antitrust, the new European competition regime is designed ʻas close at it could get 
to the US-style without copying the whole caboodle  ʼ(Rill 2003).   
  Reference to convergence is often made without further delineating the conﬁnes of the 
concept as if it was completely unambiguous. In order to determine what exactly is converging, 
the concept needs to be clariﬁed. Broadly deﬁned, convergence encompasses the tendency of 
societies, states, economic systems or, regimes as a whole to develop similarities in structures, 
processes, or performances over time. More concrete, convergence can refer to growing 
similarities in the agenda setting of policy goals and common policy problems, which can be 
indicated as discursive convergence, while a gradual narrowing of the legislative content of two 
or more jurisdictions can be indicated as substantive convergence. Convergence can further 
concern a process that leads to the adoption of similar organizational patterns, procedures, or 
the use of similar regulatory instruments, which can be indicated as organizational or systemic 
convergence, as well as procedural or regulatory convergence. Finally, convergence may point 
to the outcomes, impacts and consequences of a regulatory implementation (Drezner 2001: 53; 
Pollit 2001; Bennet 1991: 215-218). 
  Before addressing the question of convergence to the US model of private enforcement 
in greater detail, I will work out the more general signs of convergence that have taken place 
and identify the different types of convergence in order to better understand if and to what 
extend the EU moves into the US direction of competition law enforcement. 
2.1 Signs of Convergence More Generally
As outlined above, convergence can be of a discursive nature, or concern more substantive, 
organizational and procedural or regulatory matters. Yet, regardless of the speciﬁc nature, any 
convergence between the European and the US competition laws and practices needs to be 
placed in a continuing record of regular and intensive transatlantic cooperation, which dates 
back to the founding Treaty of Rome of 1957, where due to US inﬂuence competition policy 
has been incorporated as one of its core policy areas. Since then, the European Commission and 
the two US antitrust authorities, the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice (DOJ) 
and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), have concluded a range of bilateral contracts, which 
have amounted to an intensive working relationship with regard to competition cases falling 
into both jurisdictions.7 Yet, despite of the strong transatlantic liaison in competition matters, 
there are still many remaining differences between the two competition regimes.
 As far as substantive matters are concerned, occasional disputes on the clearance of 
mergers or dominant positions have brought some substantive deviations to the surface (i.e. the 
proposed GE-Honeywell merger, the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger, and more recently, 
the dominant position of Microsoft).8 Opinions diverge with regard of whether one can speak of a 
fundamentally ideological war on questions of competition control, or whether these differences 
7amount to different outcomes on a structural basis, in particular as the large and disputed cases 
confront hundreds of smaller cases in which the transatlantic cooperation has led to the same 
decisions. Furthermore, as far as substantive matters are concerned, one cannot speak of a 
process of convergence as the competition laws of the EU have strongly resembled those of the 
US from the beginning on. For example, the European Article 81 (TEC) on the prohibition of 
restrictive business practices is in rough lines equivalent to Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust 
Act of the US, while Article 82 (TEC) on the prohibition of an abusive behaviour of a dominant 
position resembles that of Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Somewhat ironically, the 
much younger European competition law goes beyond the scope of the US system, which has 
competition law on the books since the nineteenth century. The EU competition laws also cover 
state aid control, while the there are no such laws in the US federal context. 
 With regard to the speciﬁc cultural features of how competition questions are addressed 
and interpreted, one is tempted to conclude that differences have narrowed down substantially, 
indicating a process of discursive convergence. As former Commissioner Mario Monti has 
expressed it in a speech held at the UCLA Conference on US and EU Antitrust Aspects of 
Mergers and Acquisitions on 28 February 2004: “The EU and U.S. agree on what competition 
policy should be all about. We share a common fundamental vision of the role and limitations 
of public intervention.” (Monti 2004b) Yet, the differences in the ʻcultural  ʼ traits of how 
competition control is approached have been more pronounced in the past.
 Competition law can serve a variety of different goals. They range from the protection 
of free markets to the protection of small and medium sized business, speciﬁc market sectors, 
regions or national champions, the protection of workers, the environment, or even the protection 
of democratic freedom and individual autonomy, etc. European competition laws are deeply 
embedded in the integration project as they were designed to enhance the creation of the single 
European market. When competition law made its entrance to Treaty of Rome, the Freiburg 
School, or what has been labeled as the German ordo-liberal doctrine, has been predominant in 
shaping the scope of competition control (cf. Joerges 2001). According to the theoretical core of 
German ordo-liberalism, capitalism needs to be organized. Public market invention is necessary 
for the preservation of an open and free economic life. As competition control constitutes a case 
of public intervention in private market conduct par excellence, German ordo-liberalism praises 
it as something intrinsically good. Underlying the spirit of competition control is the assumption 
that markets are not perfectly self-regulatory, but jeopardized by market failures, constituted by 
an abuse of excessive market power, collusive agreements between corporate actors, and other 
restrictive business practice. Competition control provides an instrument to safeguard market 
players from the anarchy of free competition by curbing private power in open markets. The 
inﬂuence of the German ordo-liberalism is reﬂected by the fact that public market intervention 
in Europe has had a lot stronger tradition than in the US. European competition control tended 
to be marked by a greater distrust of bigness, which was due to a concern of the potentially 
negative inﬂuence of concentrated economic power. In contrast, the Chicago School has had a 
8strong inﬂuence on the US antitrust system, where the central focus of competition control is 
protect free and fair competition by all means (at least within the US territory). According to this 
paradigm, not market concentration is perceived as a central problem, but collusive agreements 
such as cartels. Thus, the mere size of a company or the holding of a dominant position should 
not be a deciding factor to block a commercial agreement or merger. Instead, market efﬁciency 
and consumer welfare should be the determining factors when assessing anti-competitive 
conduct.9 According to the Chicago School, public market intervention is intrinsically at odds 
with a free market ideology. As the market regulates itself, structural interventions should be the 
exception and be restricted to the minimum necessary. 
 Over the years, there has been heightened inﬂuence of the Chicago School in Europe, 
which is reﬂected both in terms of discursive and substantive convergence towards the US 
system.10 As far as substance is concerned, the EU has moved towards the US position, 
according to which competition authorities should not intervene if a merger and a monopoly is 
efﬁcient– ʻ even if this is at the expense of competitors and leads to further market concentration  ʼ
(Davidow 2002: 495).11 As a part of the 2004 overhaul, the European test for concentration 
has been reformulated in a way that it addresses all mergers and cooperative agreements 
that ʻsigniﬁcantly impede effective competitionʼ, which comes close to the US ʻSubstantive 
Lessening of Competition  ʼ(SLC)-test dating from 1914.12 
 With regard to discursive convergence, competition law and enforcement in Europe tends 
to be increasingly framed in terms of consumer welfare considerations (cf. Fox 2003). As Mario 
Monti emphasized in a speech on the similarities between the US and EU competition regimes: 
“We both agree that the ultimate purpose of our respective intervention in the marketplace 
should be to ensure that consumer welfare is not harmed.” (Monti 2004b) While in the US 
system, antitrust violations are viewed as tantamount to corporate fraud against consumers, 
this perspective has only recently made its inroads into anti-trust assessments in Europe. The 
protection of competitors and occasionally also employment tended to be relatively more 
determining considerations in the assessment of anticompetitive conduct. Consumer welfare 
has been declared the predominant task of competition control these days, indicating a gravity 
shift from protecting competitors to protecting consumer welfare. Consumers tend to be pictured 
as natural allies of competition authorities. In fact, next to competitors, consumers seem to be 
the only market players taken into consideration in the verbiage of competition regulators. 
The interests of employees and of society at large tend not to be politicized. The heightened 
emphasis given to consumers is manifested by the fact that prices constitute an ever more 
dominant reference point for determining anti-competitive conduct by companies. Prices should 
be as low as possible in order to beneﬁt consumers. This implies that companies have to adjust 
their prices as close as possible to the ﬁxed costs per production unit. The appointment of a 
Consumer Liaison Ofﬁcer in December 2003 within the Commissionʼs DG Competition attests 
the heightened emphasis on consumer welfare. The task ascribed to this new post is to ensure a 
permanent dialogue with European consumers and alert consumer groups to competition cases 
9where their input might be useful. 
 The discursive and substantive convergence indicates a shift in the ideological climate 
that shapes the contemporary debate on competition law and enforcement practices. It reﬂects 
a declining gap between what has come to be known as the Anglo-Saxon free market economy 
versus the Rhineland model of a regulated market economy, or, following the terminology used 
by Hall and Soskice, the Liberal Market Economy (LME) model versus the Organized Market 
Economies (OME) model (cf. Hall and Soskice 2001).  
 The systemic or organizational differences between the competition authorities in the 
US and in the EU are fundamental.13 In Europe, competition authorities tend to enjoy far-
reaching discretionary powers to address and administer the prohibition of restrictive business 
agreements and the abuse of dominant positions. In particular the European Commissionʼs DG 
Competition ﬁnds itself in a powerful and unique position not easily matched by any other 
competition authority. Moreover, there is no other ﬁrst pillar policy in which the Commission 
enjoys similar wide-ranging powers. Article 86 (TEC) gives the Commission the power to 
act as an investigator, prosecutor, judge, jury and executioner altogether (e.g. the integrated 
agency model, see for more Trebilcock and Iacobucci, 2002). The only judicial check on the 
Commission are the Court of First Instance (CFI) and the European Court of Justice (ECJ), 
which companies can appeal to in case of a disagreement with the Commissionʼs decision.14 
In the US, antitrust agencies have far less enforcing powers. Although they can initiate and 
investigate formal proceedings, all cases of infringements have to be prosecuted in the federal 
courts. This implies that a deal can only be blocked if the parties involved are sued (e.g. the 
bifurcated judicial model, see for more Trebilcock and Iacobucci, 2002). In contrast, in the EU 
the Commission can directly stop a merger, impose ﬁnes, request modiﬁcation in the proposal 
or, it can require the break up of a company by forcing it to sell some of its divisions (Bannerman 
2002: 8). Moreover, if the Commission starts the review procedure, review at the Member 
State level is preempted, whereas in the US a transaction reviewed and cleared by the Justice 
Department or the FTC may be challenged under federal as well state law. 
 The examples demonstrate, that there are many signs of convergence towards the 
US model of competition control. The next section confronts the major features of the two 
enforcement systems with each other and elaborates in greater detail on the question of 
convergence in private enforcement.      
2.2 Convergence Towards An US-Style Litigation Culture?
Competition law enforcement in Europe has traditionally been the domain of competition 
authorities. Private enforcement of EU and national competition law has been very limited in 
Europe. Only in 5% of the cases private actors took the initiative to bring an action to the court.15 
On the contrary, US competition law (the Sherman and the Clayton Act) is overwhelmingly 
invoked by private parties: more than 90% of all formal antitrust actions are due to private 
litigations before general civil courts (Kemper 2004: 9; Wils 2003: 477). The percentages of the 
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distribution between public and private competition laws conﬁrm that the US system favours 
private actions more than public actions, whereas in the EU the situation is reversed. This 
raises some important questions ﬁrst with regard to the reason why private plaintiffs in the US 
conduct 90% of all competition claims. What does the US have that the EU doesnʼt?
 The 2004 competition reform abolished the notiﬁcation scheme for commercial 
agreements between companies meeting a certain turnover threshold not falling into the 
category of mergers and acquisitions ruled by Article 82 (TEC). In order to better understand 
the implications of this change and to answer the question of convergence, I will subsequently 
compare the major features of the enforcement systems in the EU and the US. 
 Similar to the EU, the US has a notiﬁcation system in place called the Hart Scott 
Rodino (HSR) ﬁling dating from 1976.16 The HSR-ﬁling requires a mandatory notiﬁcation with 
both the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice (DoJ) for mergers, 
acquisitions of securities, asset acquisitions and the formation of joint ventures. Similar to the 
EU, the HSR-ﬁling is obligatory for companies meeting a certain turnover threshold.17 Yet, the 
US threshold measure is about 25 times lower than that in the EU, which means that a lot more 
cases are scrutinized by the US authorities.18 The large amount of notiﬁcations marks a stark 
contrast to the 9:1 private-public enforcement ratio of the US, as one would expect it to lead 
directly to more public litigations. A possible explanation lays in the fact, that the chances to 
slip though the net are higher in the US. In contrast to the European notiﬁcation regime, the 
notifying parties in the US are charged for costs of the review process.19 Moreover, the HSR 
requires far less information of the notifying parties. The US competition authorities have to 
collect additional information in order to discover whether or not a deal is problematic. As 
this provides companies with substantial leverage powers, notifying parties tend to follow a 
ʻﬁle and pray approachʼ, i.e. providing only the most basic facts and hoping that the agencies 
overlook critical features (cf. Parisi 2000).  
 The European notiﬁcation procedure is free of charge and tends to be a lot more onerous. 
Yet, it is also more structured, more formal, as well as more transparent than its transatlantic 
counterpart (e.g. Venit and Kolasky 2000: 88; Trebilcock and Iacobucci 2002: 382-383). The 
review process proceeds in different phases with ﬁxed time deadlines.20 In return, the notifying 
parties are entitled to certain procedural rights, such as the right to an oral hearing and to 
receive copies of all formal decisions. For example, if the Commission wants to enter a new 
phase of investigations, it has to express its objections to the parties in form of a reasoned 
decision. This procedure does not only narrow down the scope of issues that are scrutinized 
by the Commission, but has meanwhile also led to a voluminous body of precedents, which 
provides some guidance for other notifying parties (Venit and Kolasky 2000: 92). The formality 
of the notiﬁcation procedure makes the reviewing procedure highly transparent, but also very 
work-intensive. In contrast, the US system is much less lucid due to conﬁdentiality provisions 
in the HSR Act (Venit and Kolasky 2000: 95).21 Moreover, the US review process is less driven 
by formal, procedural milestones.22 The meetings between the authorities and the notifying 
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parties take place on an entirely informal basis and the US competition authorities do not have 
to vindicate their objections at any time during the inquiry. 
 Nonetheless, the comparatively lower degree of formality and transparency does not hold 
as an explanation for why private antitrust cases exceed those initiated by the US competition 
authorities. Instead, the mere fact that US competition agencies conduct antitrust investigations 
for the purpose of litigation, only, serves as an explanation for why only a few cases are 
ultimately challenged by public authorities before the courts. A large part of the proposed deals 
are either ʻabandoned or are modiﬁed through settlements between the parties and the agencies  ʼ
(Venit and Kolasky 2000: 96).23 Yet, in order to understand the US litigation culture in the ﬁeld 
of competition law one needs to understand also the ʻcarrots and sticks  ʼthat serve as incentives 
for private parties to take actions against antitrust infringements. There is a range of elements 
to distinguish that foster the litigation culture of the US and that are generally not to be found 
in other systems. First, if a plaintiff is successful in bringing competition infringements to 
the courts, not only the costs of suing will be recovered (i.e. expert fees and attorneyʼs fees), 
but it can also be awarded treble the damage suffered. Even foreign victims outside the US 
territory may be awarded treble damages.24 In addition to the damage compensation to victims, 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) may require all the proﬁts made from a monopoly or 
cartel agreement (Davidow 2002: 495). Moreover, the US enforcement system allows for 
the imposition of criminal sanctions for anticompetitive conduct in form of imprisonment - a 
ʻstick  ʼoften applied also to CEOs (both nationals and non-nationals) violating US antitrust law 
in foreign jurisdictions (Morici 2000: 3; Bannerman 2002: 35). Conversely, a jurisdictional 
ʻcarrot  ʼ is offered by automatic and discretionary leniency schemes, which grant immunity 
from prosecution to those who ﬁrst confess to have participated in a cartel or other forms of 
restrictive business agreements. Like this, ʻcarteleers  ʼand other infringers ﬁnd themselves in a 
prisoners dilemma. Furthermore, the US allows for class actions, collective lawsuits on behalf of 
several plaintiffs, which makes it attractive for individual consumers to initiate legal proceedings 
against large corporations. Class actions in the US are further stimulated by a widely applied 
ʻno cure no payʼ-practice in form of contingency fees offered by law companies, e.g. the fee 
paid to professional litigators representing the plaintiffs in court depends on the monetary award 
obtained. In case of an unsuccessful complaint, the legal service is free of charge. Hence, the 
system of treble damages, criminal sanctions, a leniency system, class actions, and contingency 
fees all provide incentives for private plaintiffs to bring an action before the US courts.  
 Unlike to the US, the EU has no rules that oblige the loosing party of a lawsuit to cover 
the costs of the successful one. However, under the new enforcement system of the EU, private 
litigants can be compensated for the damage suffered by the anticompetitive behavior of others. 
Yet, it remains unclear what will be taken as a basis for the calculation of damages (e.g. the 
damage suffered by a plaintiff or the proﬁts made by the infringer). In fact, linking causation 
and damage on behalf of the plaintiff is a very demanding - if not impossible – task, in particular 
because the losses of anticompetitive behavior tend to be very much dispersed rather than 
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concentrated in one victim. As Wils (2003) has pointed out “[…] damages will be calculated 
not to the offenders gain or the social loss, but by references to the losses which those plaintiffs 
who happen to bring claims manage to prove (Wils 2003: 481).  
  With regard to criminal sanctions, there is no harmonized system of penalizing 
anticompetitive behaviour. There are some Member States that impose criminal sanctions 
on individuals for the violation of competition laws, such as imprisonments or ﬁnes.25 The 
heterogeneity of sanctioning anticompetitive behaviour causes a range of anomalies under the 
new system of shared enforcement competences. For example, the European Commission and 
the European Courts have no power to impose criminal sanctions, which creates a situation that 
infringers in small cases may end up in prison in certain Member States, whereas equally guilty 
managers of the big, pan-European and extra-European competition cases investigated by the 
Commission face no individual or criminal sanctions. This imbalance may create a situation 
of legal uncertainty in which litigants shop around among the different EU jurisdictions. The 
visibility of these discriminations is likely to increase in a EU where 25 Member States have 
to apply the same EU competition law next to their national laws. As a consequence, the 
harmonization of (criminal) sanctions in the ﬁeld of competition law enforcement is likely to be 
a topic of discussion in the longer-term. At the moment, some member states consider moving 
towards a system of criminal prosecutions in order to spare shareholders from the ﬁnes imposed 
on companies. However, to date there is no Member State in which CEOs can be dismissed 
within a civil action (Waelbroeck et al. 2004: 1-3). Likewise to the US, the EU has introduced a 
leniency scheme in 1996, which after a renewal in 2002 is designed to guarantee full immunity 
to participants of a cartel that cooperate with the Commission. Yet, here again, not all Member 
States handle leniency programs, which may lead to adverse effects. 
 As far as class actions are concerned, the picture is similar to that of criminal sanctions 
and leniency programs. Class actions in form of collective standings before the courts comparable 
to those possible in the US system are not an option in most of the Member States, although 
many are currently considering to introduce them.26 However, the contemporary legal situation 
makes it unlikely that consumers can have overcharges refunded in the near future. Moreover, 
private plaintiffs, such as consumers or small and medium sized companies, are faced with 
high administrative costs to organize collective claims and the ﬁnancial risks involved in 
bringing an action to the courts. Although ﬁerce competition between law companies may lead 
to an increased application of the ʻno cure no payʼ-practice in form of contingency fees, yet, 
it remains questionable whether this is to advantage of the victims. In case of a successful 
litigation it is very likely that professional litigators will cash a large part of the compensation 
awarded to victims of anticompetitive behavior. The US experience with contingency fees is 
illustrative in this respect. As Davidow (2002) has remarked: “It is frequently alleged that class 
action recoveries for antitrust or other US torts beneﬁt lawyers more than victims.” (Davidow 
2002: 496). In addition, private plaintiffs face an even bigger obstacle as far as the collection of 
evidence is concerned. To make private actions attractive, the standards for the burden of proof 
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may need be relaxed, or then, the burden of proof may need to be reversed so that the defendants 
will have to prove that their conduct is not anti-competitive. Hence, stimulating private legal 
actions in competition matters may have far-reaching consequences for the legal systems in 
place. For example, Canada has recently undergone a shift towards more private litigation. 
Since the introduction of class actions private enforcement has expanded very rapidly, whereas 
public enforcement is declining. Although Canada does not have a system of treble damages 
or loser-pay cost rules similar to the US, the Canadian competition authority considers further 
legislative changes that stimulate a greater use of private enforcement (cf. Rowley 2002). 
 The example of Canada illustrates that the EU is not the only competition regime that is 
currently converging towards the US private enforcement system. The next section elaborates 
on the question why the EU has set the goal of increased private self-enforcement in competition 
control. It does so by sketching the discourse that sets the parameters for how competition 
enforcement should be organized.
 
3 Sketching the Discourse of Enhanced Private Competition Law Enforcement
The European Commission is optimistic that enhanced private enforcement creates sufﬁcient 
deterrence and a stronger incentive for companies to ensure that their business agreements are 
not anti-competitive. It depicts the low percentage of private enforcement in Europe as lagging 
behind the US system and portrays the situation as a severe ʻunderdevelopmentʼ, which should 
be rectiﬁed (Waelbroeck et al. 2004: 1-29). Yet, while the US avenue of private enforcement is 
portrayed as a key to substantial improvements in competition control, somewhat ironically US 
practioners tend to have much critique on their system. They warn about the possibility of an 
excessive claimantʼs culture in the ﬁeld of antitrust. According to an US judge: ʻthe inﬂuence of 
the private action on the development of antitrust doctrine has been on the whole a pernicious 
one  ʼ(cited in Wils 2003: 486). Venit and Kolasky (2000) come to a similar conclusion when 
arguing that “[…] there seems to be a growing consensus among U.S.-based practioners who 
handled merger in both jurisdictions that the EU merger clearance process has some advantages 
over the U.S. system […]” (Venit and Kolasky 2000: 80-81). Moreover, following Davidow 
(2002) who argues that even though US authorities have put much effort in making the European 
competition laws converge towards the US model, these efforts have never been directed at 
promoting the US system of private antitrust enforcement (Davidow 2002: 493).
 The European Commission celebrates the abolishment of Regulation 17 as a milestone 
in terms of efﬁciency considerations. It argues that the notiﬁcation procedure has been a timely 
and costly administrative procedure, not only for the Commission, but also for companies 
involved. This line of argument reﬂects an overall tendency of how competition control is 
framed. Not only anticompetitive conduct of market players is perceived as a hindrance to 
effective competition, but competition authorities themselves are increasingly depicted as 
costly and inefﬁcient administrative distortions to what is termed free and fair competition (cf. 
Crampton and Facey 2002). The abolishment of the notiﬁcation regime for cooperative business 
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agreements provides a case in point in which the rationale of a regulatory framework has been 
questioned. For example, Mario Monti describes the notiﬁcation procedure as unnecessary 
burden on competition and compares to parking a car in a town: “Working through a pile of 
mostly innocuous notiﬁcations may have made sense 40 years ago: it simply does not make 
sense now. Any citizen must know whether he/she can park his/her car in the centre of the town. 
He or she shouldnʼt have to go to the police station to check ﬁrst. […] (t)he Commissionʼs 
role, as an antitrust enforcer, is not to give comfort.” (Monti 2004c) The car-allegory reﬂects a 
shifting away from supervisory market control to less market intervention and enhanced private 
authority in competition law enforcement. It accentuates a strong belief in the self-correcting 
market-mechanisms.   
 Another recurring argument of the European Commission is that the abolition of the 
notiﬁcation system frees resources for the detection of cartels, price-ﬁxing and other harmful 
agreements on a global level, a ﬁeld that has become the utmost priority of the European 
Commission. The Commission has repeatedly complained about an unbearable workload that 
resulted from the intensiﬁcation of economic transnationalization of the past decades (i.e. 
the increase of cross-border trade and market interdependences, the ICT-revolution and the 
resulting increased mobility of investors based in different parts of the world). In particular 
the 1990s witnessed an accelerated pace of cross-border merger activity and acquisitions - 
generally indicated as the ﬁfth merger wave in history, as well as an substantive increase of 
joint ventures, cooperative arrangements, distribution/supplier agreements, licensing and 
franchising contracts. 27 The Commission feared that the workload would further increase with 
the enlargement of the Union to 25 Member States. It appears that a restructuring towards 
enhanced private enforcement provides a deus ex machina to bear with a mass of cases on 
the Commissionʼs desks. Yet, the logjam of work and the shortcoming of staff resources are a 
highly controversial argument for increased private enforcement. Following Wils (2003) it is 
of general interest that all cases are prosecuted. Antitrust enforcement ʻalways has a costʼ. It 
all depends on ʻhow much value society attaches to the avoidance of antitrust violations  ʼ(Wils 
2003: 485).
 The central importance attached to consumers is also reverberated in the discussion on 
private enforcement. Mario Monti highlighted in his speech on European Competition Day on 
29th April 2004 in Dublin that ʻconsumers can play an increased role in extended system of 
private enforcement in Europe and I would like to see them play it  ʼ(Monti 2004d). The European 
Commission believes that once a system of damage relief is introduced, private parties will go 
much further in bringing actions to the courts than competition authorities (cf. Monti 2004a). 
Yet, to create a real incentive for private actors to police themselves may require introducing a 
high level of damage awards to successful plaintiffs. However, high damage awards in turn are 
likely to create a situation in which proﬁt motives are the driving force for litigation. In order 
to further clarify this argument, the next section draws the attention to the interests at stake in a 
system of enhanced privatization of competition law enforcement. 
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4 All to the Beneﬁt of the Legal Professions?
The delegation of competition law enforcement to private actors means that companies have to 
administer and test themselves whether or not they abide the law. As not many companies possess 
their own in-house expertise in competition matters, the private enforcement is to the beneﬁt of 
a whole market sector selling legal services. In particular the top-ranking law companies with a 
high degree of specialized expertise and technical know-how in the ﬁeld of competition law are 
likely to proﬁt from the new situation. Large law companies tend to be organized as integrated 
networks of individual partner agencies in different regions of the world (Kolasky 2000: 153) 
(i.e. PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte and Touche, Ashurst, Arthur Anderson, KPMG Ernest 
and Young, Baker&McKenzie, Freshﬁelds Bruckhaus Deringer, and many more). With member 
ﬁrms organized in different countries, the spectrum of expertise is not only concentrated in 
domestic antitrust laws and practices, but also in ﬁelds of multi-jurisdictional issues relating 
to cross-border transactions. The comparative advantage is constituted by the fact that national 
advisors and litigators are not only familiar with a particular national legal system, but also 
licensed in that system.28 
 With the introduction of increased private self-enforcement, the demand for legal 
services becomes ever more versatile. Enhanced private enforcement stimulates the demand 
for private litigation lawyers defending or accusing companies in lawsuits. Although litigation 
culture creates proﬁt for law companies, their job is to avoid litigation (Trebilcock and Iacobucci 
2002: 369-370). Companies have a strong incentive to resolve conﬂicts without tiresome 
litigation processes due to the high costs and the negative publicity that come along with it. 
Thus, in addition to litigation support, private enforcement creates an even greater demand for 
practical legal advice on how to minimize antitrust risks and how to deal with competitors. As a 
consequence of private self-assement with respect to Article 81 (TEC), law companies will get 
more opportunities to assist their clients in making commercial agreements and to offer tailor-
made compliance programs in which they counsel their clients on the antitrust implications 
of their business transactions.29 Moreover, more and more law companies also offer targeted 
lobbying activities at the European institutions and the national regulatory institutions.30   
 The new enforcement system is not to the advantage of corporate actors in ﬁrst instance. 
In fact, they are likely to be adversely affected since they risk standing in courts more often as 
defendants rather than plaintiffs. As companies have a stake in avoiding ﬁnancial and criminal 
sanctions, in particular large companies may tend to simply buy off the plaintiffs before the case 
is even brought to the courts. For example, the Microsoft case had originally ﬁve plaintiffs yet, 
due to accommodation payments, the Commission is currently the only remaining claimant. 
From the perspective of companies, the abolishment of the notiﬁcation system for cooperative 
agreements creates a regime that is less predictable given the lack of judicial precedents. Case 
law on the issue of cooperative agreements, sanctioning and the award of damage to victims 
still has to come. Prior to the reform, companies could rely on the Commissionʼs comfort 
letters – a legal security for companies to proceed with an agreement, or they could apply for 
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individual exemption, which guaranteed immunity from legal prosecution. The new regime 
deprives companies from this legal assurance. Thus, early jurisprudence may require its share 
of victims until the legal situation is clariﬁed. The European Commission rejects this argument. 
Following Mario Monti, ʻafter 40 years of experience the application of European competition 
law should be sufﬁciently clear to business  ʼ(Monti 2004c). 
 Enhanced private litigation in competition affairs provides an avenue for consumer 
organizations, as well as labour unions and more diffuse interests such as society at large to 
intervene in cooperative agreements or mergers that are likely to have a negative impact on 
their position. However, they may face considerable constraints to bring an action to the courts. 
For a successful handling of complaints both plaintiffs and accused depend on the information 
provided by law companies, making them dependent on legal services. The costs of these 
services, as well as the costs of the whole litigation process may be unaffordable for certain 
potential plaintiffs, in particular individual consumers and small and medium sized companies. 
Moreover, as not all law companies handle an impartiality code of case acceptance, access to 
legal justice may be difﬁcult for certain victims. Hence, the legal expertise accumulated in law 
ﬁrms creates a vast asymmetry of knowledge, which makes victims of anticompetitive conduct 
vulnerable to poor quality and inadequate advice. Currently there is an overall tendency in Europe 
to liberalize these professions and allow para-legal professionals to offer the same services in 
order to increase inter-professional competition.31 In particular the end of price and entry ﬁxing 
systems is argued to beneﬁt the consumers who enjoy a greater choice between suppliers of 
legal services. Opponents, on the contrary, warn that lax or no control of professional services 
may be to the disadvantage of a wider public interest and lead to distorting situations (cf. Bergh 
2004).   
 Given the high interest of law companies in the future development of competition 
law enforcement, the high-level involvement of national and international bar associations 
in the competition policy-making process should not surprise. The interaction of competition 
authorities and individual law companies, as well as bar associations is often stimulated from 
both sides. Both competition authorities and law companies share a high turnover of staff. 
The ʻcompetition brain drain  ʼis likely to be directed towards the private sector, where salaries 
tend to be higher. Yet, the European Commission often actively seeks advice of the interest 
groups representing legal professions that deal with competition law, such as the Council 
of the Bars and Law Societies of the European Union (CCBE), the European Company 
Lawyers Association (ECLA), the different national bar associations and the International 
Bar Association (IBA).32 For example, at the 8th Annual Conference of the IBA in Fiesole, 
Italy, 17 September 2004, Commissioner Mario Monti asked for suggestions of the IBA on 
how to improve the legal framework that allows for private enforcement of competition rules 
(cf. Monti 2004a). Similarly, the law company Ashurst has conducted a comparative study on 
behalf of the European Commissionʼs DG Competition. The study identiﬁes the major judicial 
obstacles in EU Member States and suggests national reforms to facilitate private enforcement 
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of competition law (cf. Waelbroeck et al. 2004). 
 Hence, views, ideas and practical experience from both public and private competition 
law practioners are regularly exchanged at conferences, workshops or other more informal 
meetings. As John Fingleton, Chairmen of the Irish Competition Authority has pointed out at 
the 2004 European Competition Day in Amsterdam: “Itʼs like listening to a piece of symphonic 
music: you hear the main theme over and over again in different ways, so that by the time you 
leave the concert hall you are humming the tune.”
Conclusions: Striking the Balance Between Public and Private Enforcement
The abolishment of the notiﬁcation system with regard to Article 81 (TEC) introduces a 
situation in which companies cannot rely anymore on the Commissionʼs approval, but will 
have to undergo a self-assessment in order to ensure that a commercial agreement does not 
amount to anticompetitive behavior. The new enforcement regime puts more responsibility 
on private actors to carefully analyze the markets in which they operate before they engage in 
an agreement with a competitor, while freeing competition authorities from this task. In case 
companies assess the situation wrong, they run the chance to be challenged before the courts. 
Similar to the US system where 90% of all antitrust cases are private actions, under new system 
affected parties such as competitors, supplier and distributor companies, as well as individual 
consumers and employees should feel encouraged to bring infringements of competition law to 
the national and European courts. 
 The paper has embedded the recent changes in European competition law enforcement 
in the context of convergence between the US and EU competition control. Signs of substantive, 
procedural and discursive convergence are many. A comparison between the major features of 
the two enforcement systems reveals that the EU is moving closer towards the US in competition 
enforcement. The shift towards a system of increased private actions is an example hereof. The 
reliance on the market intelligence in spotting anticompetitive conduct reﬂects a broader trend 
towards less market intervention by public authorities. 
 Shifting the burden of competition law enforcement to the private sector has many 
drawbacks. The paper has identiﬁed a range of problems that hinge on increased private self-
enforcement. There is much reason to assume that the abolishment of the notiﬁcation procedure 
creates a situation of legal uncertainty among companies. Analyzing anticompetitive conduct 
is not an exact science with immanent guidelines of what accounts as an infringement and 
what not. On the contrary, there is always a subjective and speculative element in judging anti-
competitive behavior. Moreover, markets are very dynamic, which leads to novel situations 
without precedents.  
 Following from a comparison with the US system of private litigation in competition 
matters, further legislative reforms might follow in Europe. At the moment there are many 
barriers for plaintiffs to bring an action to the courts. Corporate and individual actors do not 
have comparable investigative powers to that of competition authorities, who enjoy a privileged 
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access to collect the necessary evidence. Due to conﬁdentiality reasons companies cannot access 
market information of their competitors, which makes it very difﬁcult for private entities ﬁrst 
to discover an anti-competitive action of a competitor and to collect the necessary evidence to 
assess competition law infringements. Evidence collection is in particular a demanding task if 
the respective competitor(s) operate on a transnational basis.  
 The aim of enhanced private litigation is likely to bring about a system of damage 
payments awarded to victims of anticompetitive conduct. However, assessing a plausible basis 
for calculating the damages suffered by a claimant is an arduous task in the competition context. 
The reliance of increased private self-enforcement may have as a consequence that private 
actions are driven by motives of a monetary nature, which fundamentally diverge from the 
general interest of society, in particular as the losses of anticompetitive behavior tend to be 
very dispersed rather than concentrated in one victim. Although the losses of consumers should 
not be extrapolated to losses suffered by the wider society, consumers are likely to be the 
ones least aware of competition law violations, or then ﬁnancially and organizationally not be 
able to provide the necessary evidence and bring an action to the courts. Hence, even though 
consumers tend to be increasingly at the center of attention in competition law enforcement, 
private enforcement risks being mere lip service to this group.
   Although it remains to be seen what future impacts the reform will cause, the paper 
somewhat tentatively contends that this is a rather risky endeavor with regard to regulatory 
stringency as it may stimulate a claimantʼs culture driven merely by proﬁt motives. The ones 
to proﬁt from private self-assessment and increased litigations are law companies providing 
advocacy services to companies. 
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Notes
1 EU competition laws rest on three pillars: the prohibition of anticompetitive agreements, the so-called anti-
trust or cartel policy (Article 81), the prohibition of the abusive of a dominant position, the so-called merger and 
acquisition control (Article 82) and state aid control (Article 87). The main areas covered by these areas are: the 
abuse of dominance by a company, the imposition of trade barriers, company agreements, joint-ventures and 
strategic alliances, mergers and take-overs, national and regional state aid.     
2 There is no harmonized competition law in the EU, nor do all Member States have the same scope of competition 
laws on their books. National competition law is applied alongside European laws. Until the 1950s competition law 
regimes in the European countries were absent. They only gradually emerged – though with varying effectiveness. 
Each Member State enforces different norms and practices with different levels of stringency. For example, the 
Netherlands had its merger control system introduced in the mid-1990s.
3 The ECN is established in a ﬁeld where accomplishing a fully-ﬂedged de facto harmonization is not an option, since 
this would severely intrude on the Member Stateʼs autonomy. Yet, intensiﬁed intra-EU cooperation in competition 
matters may ultimately work as a convergence catalyst without a de facto harmonization of substantive law – a sort 
harmonization through the backdoor as the ECN provides a means to ʻexert normative force  ʼ(Gerber 2002: 13) 
and policy learning. Through cooperation and the exchange of so-called ʻbest practicesʼ, the competition culture 
among the national enforcers is hoped to converge. Whether this will ultimately be achieved in the future remains 
to be seen.  
4 In the preparatory stages of the reform, there has also the term of re-nationalization been applied. Yet, re-
nationalization implies that a ﬁeld that previously has been the entire sphere of Community competence is given 
back into the hands of Member States. A closer look raises considerable doubts whether re-nationalization is the 
correct label as European competition enforcement is not given back into the hands of Member States. European 
competition laws have always been truly ʻEuropean  ʼas Member States had their own competition laws alongside 
European laws. 
5 The rather dull name ʻRegulation No. 1/2003  ʼhas been given by the Danish presidency in 2003, under which it 
also has been enacted. For transitional reasons, it became fully applicable as part of the competition law reform 
in May 2004. As a part of the transitional period, national judges have received training in the application of 
European competition laws. 
6 Regulation No. 1/2003 is applicable to deals between companies with a combined, worldwide turnover of at 
least €5 billion or more than €250 million each in sales in Europe continue to have to be notiﬁed in advance to 
the Commission and its 150 person Merger Task Force (unless they each realize more than 2/3 of their European 
turnover in one and the same country). This means that turnover thresholds decide whether or not a merger 
or acquisition has a Community dimension and whether it is the Commissionʼs task to check it. The scope of 
investigations is though not limited to cases within the EU, but it includes also larger deals of global companies 
with a non-Community dimension, including non-EU ﬁrms. The most striking high proﬁle case outside the EU is 
currently that of the software giant Microsoft.  
7 The ﬁrst contract, called Bilateral Cooperation Agreement dates back to 1991. It got subsequently reﬁned in 
additional agreements signed in 1998 and 1999, i.e. the formal and binding Positive Comity Agreement (PCA) and 
the non-binding Administrative Arrangements on Attendance (AAA) (cf. Damro 2001).
8 One is tempted to conclude that the US enforcement of competition law has become a lot laxer over the past few 
years. Since the presidency of Georg W. Bush, the US-competition policy has taken a more laissez-faire character, 
which can be observed in the a lot softer remedies than that once seemed possible concerning the Microsoft case.
9 Other prominent theoretical schools of thought that address competition questions are the Harvard School and the 
Austrian School. The Harvard School puts the center of gravity to the protection of small business and pluralism 
of independent market agents, distribution equity, consumer sovereignty optimal factor allocation, technological 
progress and the decentralization of power. The emphasis of Austrian school (or ʻSchumpeterian approachesʼ) 
is on the freedom of competition and the advantages thereof (Budzinski 2002: 10-11; cf. Hildebrand 2002; cf. 
Budzinski 2003). 
10  Although commentators increasingly tend to talk of an era of Post-Chicago School and argue that a European 
School of Competition Law (e.g. the ʻ extended structure-conduct-performance frameworkʼ) has gained ground, the 
efﬁciency and consumer aspects of the Chicago School remain central. The Chicago School is strongly behavioral 
and focuses foremost on a ʻsurvival of the ﬁttestʼ-logic (Hildebrand 2002: 3-4).
11 The efﬁciency question tends to be interpreted differently by the two competition authorities. Although 
efﬁciency considerations can be a sufﬁcient reason to clear a merger, efﬁciency considerations have tended not to 
be determining in Europe.  On the contrary, as Venet and Kolasky (2000) state, the argument that a merger create 
a more efﬁcient company “[…] is itself reason for challenging the transaction” (Venit and Kolasky 2000: 85). The 
line of argument lies in the fact that efﬁciency may be a sign of dominance. Yet, efﬁciency concerns are the driving 
force of most transnational mergers in the 1990s, which has made the Commission move closer to the efﬁciency 
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argument.
12 The old European ʻ Dominance  ʼtest stated that ʻ a concentration, which creates or strengthens a dominant position, 
as result of which effective competition would be signiﬁcantly impeded in the common market or a substantial 
part of it, shall be declared incompatible with the common marketʼ. According to this deﬁnition, European merger 
review has overwhelmingly focused on tackling single-ﬁrm dominance resulting from a merger, rather than 
naturally grown dominant positions. The rewording allows the European competition authorities to challenge all 
types of dominant positions, including oligopoly or naturally grown dominant positions – all cases for which the 
Commission previously lacked the competence. The US SLC-test found its major support with the DG COMP, the 
British, the Irish and the Swedish competition authorities, which have already adopted the SLC in their national 
regimes. The German, Dutch, Italian and Luxembourg competition authorities, on the contrary, have strongly 
opposed the introduction of the SLC-test. They accused the Commission of ʻtoying  ʼwith legal concepts and of 
risking more legal uncertainty. As a result of the tensions, a compromise version has been set up, a sort hybrid 
between the SLC and the Dominance-test (European Voice, 20.11.2003).     
13  Trebilcock and Iacobucci (2002) identify three categories of different models of competition law institutions: 
the bifurcated judicial model, the bifurcated agency model, and the integrated agency model. The bifurcated 
judicial type includes specialized investigative and enforcement authorities that bring formal complaints before 
the courts. Likewise, in the bifurcated agency model formal complaints are brought before separate, specialized 
adjudicative agencies. Contrariwise, in the integrated agency model a single specialised agency does all 
investigative, enforcement and adjudicative activities. In reality, these features of these models can appear in 
different combinations (cf. Trebilcock and Iacobucci 2002).   
14 There are no specialized courts on competition law providing judicial checks on the Commissionʼs decisions and 
procedures. Yet, after years of experience, the CFI is slowly transforming into a specialized competition court.   
15 The somewhat tentative statistics of damage claims in the EU reveal the following picture: there have been 
around 60 judged cases in which damage payments have been awarded to victims of anticompetitive conducts, of 
which 12 concerned EC competition law, 32 national law and 6 both (Waelbroeck et al. 2004: 1-1). 
16 As a proper comparison between HSR and the European notiﬁcation system would extend the scope of this 
paper, I will concentrate only on the most crucial differences. 
17 The HSR has been reformed in April 2002. The reform introduced that even companies located outside the US 
acquiring the stock of another foreign ﬁrm - yet with substantial exports (more than US $50 million) to the US has 
to comply to HSR (Davidow 2002: 497). Moreover, the reform raised the notifying threshold, which was deemed 
necessary as the US agencies reviewed virtually all transactions since 1976 due to the nominal ﬁxation of the $15 
million acquisition threshold. With inﬂationary corrections the amount would equal $125 million transaction in 
2000 (Venit and Kolasky 2000: 90). Under the new rules, a transaction is judged if one parties has sales or assets 
of at least US$ 100 million and the other at least US$ 10 million.  
18 In ﬁscal year 1998, the U.S. agencies received 4,728 notiﬁcations, 28 percent more than the previous year and 
three times the number of ﬁlings received in 1991 (Parisi 2000). 
19 In 2000 over US$ 100 million was collected under the HSR Act, in 2001 US$ 86.3 million. The revenues are then 
split between the two competition agencies. There has been a debate on whether the Commission should launch a 
charge for the notiﬁcation work with a baseline fee of €30,000 adjustable to the size and complexity of the merger 
in order to increase the resources available to the DG Competition (Bannerman, 2002: 11). So far no decisions 
have been taken into this direction. 
20 Under the new system, notifying parties have to meet the deadline of 25 working days before an agreement 
leading to a concentration has been signed. In the old system, the deadline was seven days. Violations to the period 
or reluctance to notiﬁcation can lead to the imposition of ﬁnes. In the new system more ﬂexibility is introduced. 
If the deadline is hard to meet, the deadline extended with another 10 working days. Deadlines have not caused 
many problems in the past as most of the notiﬁcations have been preceded by informal triangular contacts, which 
were not subject to a legal deadline (Venit and Kolasky 2000: 94). After phase 1, an in-depth inquiry phase of 90 
working days starts, which again can be extended to another 15-20 working days.     
21 For example, the pre-merger notiﬁcations may not be publicized. The EU Merger Control Regulation, on the 
contrary, requires publishing the notiﬁcation in the Ofﬁcial Journal, which provides a chance for third parties to 
react and reconcile with the proposed merger. 
22 In the US notiﬁcation procedure, the reviewing agencies are also subject to a time deadline. They have to ﬁnish 
the review within a short period of 20 days. As this is hard to comply with, competition agencies tend to stretch the 
time of investigation by issuing a second request for information. The unwarranted expenses resulting from such 
delays are described by Venit and Kolasky (2000) as ʻunnecessarily broad and burdensome as it can take many 
months, produce hundreds of boxes of documents, which remain mainly unread  ʼ(Venit and Kolasky 2000: 94). 
23 For example, between 1993 and 1998, US courts have issued fewer than twenty published decisions on substantive 
merger issues, whereas the US Supreme Court has not decided a substantive merger case since 1975 (Venit and 
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Kolasky 2000: 96).
24 Following Section 16 of the Clayton Act ʻ any person, ﬁrm, corporation, or association has the right to sue for and 
have injunctive relief against threatened loss or damage by violation of the antitrust lawsʼ. 
25 For example, in Germany, United Kingdom, Denmark, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Luxembourg and Austria, 
also individuals can be ﬁned, and some of them (Germany, Austria, France, Ireland, Luxembourg) employ criminal 
sanctions, such as imprisonment – although they are seldom enforced (Gauer 2002: 11). Moreover, some member 
states grant immunity to those that are ﬁrst to admit their anti-competitive activities (Bannerman 2002: 35-36). 
26 For example, in Sweden a system of ʻopt in  ʼ class actions has been introduced in order to allow plaintiffs 
stepping into a litigation procedure that has already started. However, the ʻopt in  ʼpossibility is reserved to parties 
of a contractual relationship with the infringing party, only. Also Germany has included a range of measures 
that facilitate private actions into its 7th amendment of competition law, the 7. GWB- Novelle, while the Dutch 
competition authority is currently reviewing on how to improve private enforcement (cf. Waelbroeck et al. 
2004).
27 The ﬁfth merger wave stands out, as increasingly also companies with similar size merge, including successful 
global players, whereas the past big merger waves were characterized by larger companies ʻeating  ʼsmaller ones. 
The four other merger waves identiﬁed in the literature range from 1897 to 1904, from 1916 or 1920 to 1929, 
from 1956 to 1973 (or then from 1965 to 1969) and from 1984 to 1989 (cf. Carroll 2002; Kleinert and Klodt 2002; 
Gaughan 2002). 
28 Law companies do not only employ lawyers but also increasingly tend to employ economists. As the European 
Commission has more and more moved towards a economic based approach in the investigation of anticompetitive 
conduct, sophisticated methods for market deﬁnitions and microeconomic analyses of market power have become 
ever more important, raising the demand for economic expertise.
29 Law companies also advise companies on their rights in case of dawn raid investigations by a competition 
authority or advice on leniency applications. As companies may tend to fully exploit the range of legal mobility 
provided by market regulations, compliance and dawn raid programs can also entail advocacy on how to avoid 
the detection of anticompetitive behavior by competition authorities, and how to destroy evidence of a collusive 
agreement - which would make law companies partners in crime. 
30 The range of products offered by law companies entails advocacy with respect to the different stages in the 
clearance of mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures, access to markets, the compatibility of settlements that may 
cause horizontal and vertical restraints, discriminatory and predatory pricing, monopolization or the abuse of a 
dominant position, cartel allegations, state aid, patent/intellectual property matters, public procurement, consumer 
protection issues, etc.
31 Private legal professions have long been excluded from free market competition. To date, the control of the 
legal profession in Europe is governed by the Member States. Depending on the Member State, these professions 
are more or less independent from governmental supervision and more or less publicly regulated. In a number 
of Member States professional associations (e.g. bar associations) with statutory powers regulate the conduct of 
these professions in order to protect the professionʼs reputation. They set the conditions of entry, the minimum 
and maximum tariffs, restrict the scope of activity, regulate the education and the freedom of establishment, etc., 
making them a sort cartel-like institution with a monopoly position (Herrman 2004; Jenny 2004). 
32 The CCBE encompasses member bars and law societies of the EU and the European Economic Area (EEA) has 
been established in 1988. It is ofﬁcially recognized by the EU Commission as a representative organization of 
about 700,000 European lawyers, and enjoys consultative status (see for more http://www.ccbe.org). ECLA is the 
confederation of national associations of company lawyers in Europe created in 1983 (see for more: http://www.
ecla.org). 
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